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SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS AND THE PRIVATE 
BENEFIT DOCTRINE:  WILL PARTICIPATION 
JEOPARDIZE A NONPROFIT’S TAX-
EXEMPT STATUS? 
Peter G. Dagher Jr.* 
 
In August 2012, the first social impact bond in the United States was 
implemented, introducing a revolutionary framework that aligns the 
incentives of the participants and provides nonprofits with a steady source 
of long term funding to scale up social projects.  In the prevailing social 
impact bond structure, private investors essentially place a bet with a 
government agency that the selected nonprofits will accomplish 
measureable goals through a comprehensive project designed to reduce 
public costs.  If the program fails to reach these goals, the investors lose the 
bet and their entire financial commitment to the social impact bond.  If the 
program succeeds, the government agency repays the initial investment 
plus a profit margin to the investors.  This Note examines social impact 
bonds from a nonprofit’s perspective and answers the question whether the 
profit margin that the private investors may achieve would qualify as an 
impermissible private benefit that would allow the IRS to revoke a 
participating nonprofit’s tax-exempt status. 
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“We currently call charity giving money away and business as business, 
[but] this is somewhere in between.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
A social impact bond (SIB) is a new financing mechanism gaining 
widespread international attention, where private investors provide access 
to large amounts of working capital money to nonprofits.2  In return, the 
government promises to repay this amount plus interest if the nonprofits 
meet specified outcomes that result in public savings.3  This device creates 
a quasi–equity instrument through a unique agreement structure among the 
participants (investors, government, and nonprofits).4  If the nonprofits are 
successful in reaching the outcomes agreed upon in the SIB, private 
investors will receive a profitable payout—potentially raising issues with 
the participating nonprofits’ tax-exempt status.5  If unsuccessful, the 
government is not obliged to pay, leaving the financial risk with the 
investors.6 
On August 2, 2012, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg 
announced that Goldman Sachs agreed to loan MDRC7 $9.6 million in the 
first-ever SIB in the United States.8  The SIB was designed to implement a 
comprehensive recidivism prevention program for former juvenile prisoners 
on Rikers Island that aims to reduce reincarceration rates and the associated 
 
 1. Lucas Kavner, Social Impact Bonds Help Investors Bridge Philanthropy and 
Business Goals, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 18, 2012, 4:27 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/2012/10/18/social-impact-bonds-investing-philanthropy_n_1979614.html (quoting 
Sonal Shah, former White House Director of the Office of Social Innovation and Civic 
Participation). 
 2. See MCKINSEY & CO., FROM POTENTIAL TO ACTION:  BRINGING SOCIAL IMPACT 
BONDS TO THE US 7, 12–16 (2012) [hereinafter MCKINSEY REPORT], available at https://
mckinseyonsociety.com/downloads/reports/Social-Innovation/McKinsey_Social_Impact_
Bonds_Report.pdf.  SIB literature usually uses the term “service providers” to refer to the 
role typically performed by nonprofits because the term is more inclusive and SIBs could 
also potentially work with a for-profit entity taking on the same responsibilities as 
nonprofits.  This Note discusses the issues faced by nonprofits involved in SIBs and, as such, 
will exclusively refer to “service providers” as nonprofits. 
 3. See id. 
 4. See Esmé E. Deprez & Michelle Kaske, Goldman Sachs Inmate Bet Fuels Social-
Impact Bonds:  Muni Credit, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 21, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-21/goldman-sachs-inmate-bet-fuels-social-impact-bonds-
muni-credit.html. 
 5. Charitable nonprofits that pay out profits could lose their tax-exempt status. See 
Thomas Kelley, Rediscovering Vulgar Charity:  A Historical Analysis of America’s Tangled 
Nonprofit Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2473 (2005). 
 6. See MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 2, at 12. 
 7. MDRC is a tax-exempt nonprofit under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue 
Code that provides educational and social services for disadvantaged populations. See 
MDRC FINANCIAL STATEMENTS TOGETHER WITH REPORT OF INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED PUBLIC 
ACCOUNTANTS 5 (2011), available at http://www.mdrc.org/sites/default/files/img/mdrc_2011
_audit_report.pdf. 
 8. See David W. Chen, Goldman To Invest in City Jail Program, Profiting If 
Recidivism Falls Sharply, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2012. 
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costs to the government.9  This innovative new investment was the second 
of its kind in the world10 and marks what could be a major shift in the way 
that nonprofits, the government, and the private sector interact with one 
another.11 
The Rikers Island SIB is structured as a $9.6 million loan from Goldman 
Sachs to MDRC, the managing nonprofit, which has contracted with the 
Osborne Association and the Friends of Island Academy to establish the 
Adolescent Behavioral Learning Experience (ABLE) program.12  ABLE is 
designed to reduce the recidivism rates for former juvenile inmates from the 
Rikers Island Prison, where an alarming 50 percent of young offenders are 
imprisoned again within a year of release.13  The Vera Institute of Justice 
will provide an independent assessment of whether the project successfully 
reaches its benchmarks.14  The New York City Department of Correction 
has agreed to pay MDRC if the target population’s recidivism rate 
decreases by at least 10 percent over four years.15  If successful, MDRC 
would then repay Goldman Sachs the principal amount plus a variable rate 
of return up to 20 percent.16  Even if the program fails to reach the targeted 
10 percent reduction in recidivism, Bloomberg Philanthropies, Mayor 
Bloomberg’s own nonprofit organization, supplied MDRC with a $7.2 
million grant to be held as a guarantee for that portion of Goldman Sachs’s 
 
 9. See id. 
 10. The first ever SIB was developed in 2010 between a consortium of charitable and 
private investors, a collection of nonprofits, and the British government. See JITINDER KOHLI 
ET AL., WHAT ARE SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS? AN INNOVATIVE NEW FINANCING TOOL FOR 
SOCIAL PROGRAMS 3–4 (2012), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/86267243/What-
Are-Social-Impact-Bonds; Tina Rosenberg, The Promise of Social Impact Bonds, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 20, 2012, 7:00 AM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/20/the-
promise-of-social-impact-bonds/.  For additional information on this SIB, see infra notes 
200–08 and accompanying text. 
 11. See Max Rivlin-Nadler, Goldman Sachs Looks To Turn a Profit on a Program To 
Fight Recidivism, NATION (Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.thenation.com/article/169472/
goldman-sachs-looks-turn-profit-program-fight-recidivism. 
 12. ABLE is a multifaceted program to provide helpful intervention services to sixteen 
to eighteen year olds at Rikers Island and after release.  The program is designed to decrease 
participant recidivism through improved decision making, problem solving, and self-control 
training.  ABLE plans to assist roughly 3,000 adolescents each year for the four-year term of 
the SIB. See Presentation, Mayor of N.Y.C. Michael Bloomberg, Bringing Social Impact 
Bonds to New York City 5 (2012), http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/2012/sib_media_
presentation_080212.pdf [hereinafter Bloomberg Presentation]. 
 13. See Kristina Costa & Jitinder Kohli, Social Impact Bonds:  New York City and 
Massachusetts To Launch the First Social Impact Bond Programs in the United States, 
CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 5, 2012), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/
economy/news/2012/11/05/43834/new-york-city-and-massachusetts-to-launch-the-first-
social-impact-bond-programs-in-the-united-states/. 
 14. See Bloomberg Presentation, supra note 12, at 4. 
 15. See id. at 7. 
 16. The variable rate of return to be paid is determined by the reduction in recidivism 
rates. See id. at 6–7 (showing that if recidivism is reduced by 20 percent, the Department of 
Correction will pay MDRC $11,712,000 to repay Goldman Sachs plus interest); see also 
M.S., Social-Impact Bonds:  I’ll Put $2.4m on Recidivism To Fall, ECONOMIST (Aug. 6, 
2012, 12:32 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2012/08/social-
impact-bonds. 
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investment.17  This unique feature18 of the Rikers Island SIB limits 
Goldman Sachs’ exposure to only a $2.4 million downside if the program 
fails to reduce recidivism by 10 percent.19 
While the Rikers Island program was the first SIB in the United States, 
SIBs are gaining national attention with additional programs planned in 
numerous other locations in the United States.20  The potential market for 
SIBs may represent “a multi-billion dollar source of growth capital for the 
social sector.”21 
Numerous types of programs have been identified as compatible with 
SIBs; however, the initial projects have been implemented to reduce 
recidivism.22  In the United States alone, over $6 billion taxpayer dollars 
are spent each year to incarcerate juveniles.23  SIBs are well suited to tackle 
this problem, since the effects of past social service programs in the field 
have been easy to monitor and result in quantifiable savings to the 
government.24  Other potential programs must be able to show that the 
government would be capable of saving money from outcomes that are 
easily observed and measured.25  In particular, homelessness programs have 
been identified as another future SIB application.26  Homelessness is an 
area where the U.S. government spends several billons of dollars per year 
on remedial programs but very little in preventive programs that are 
compatible with the SIB model.27  In fact, additional projects have been 
planned in Massachusetts to address juvenile justice and homelessness.28  
SIBs have also been suggested for projects improving preventive 
 
 17. See Bloomberg Presentation, supra note 12, at 4. 
 18. The guarantee provided in the Rikers Island SIB to cover downside risk is not a 
typical component of the conventional SIB structure. See Costa & Kohli, supra note 13. 
 19. See Deprez & Kaske, supra note 4.  For a detailed illustration of how the SIB 
functions, see Costa & Kohli, supra note 13. 
 20. Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Ohio have also contemplated initiating SIBs. See 
Chen, supra note 8; see also KOHLI ET AL., supra note 10, at 10. 
 21. SOCIAL FINANCE, A NEW TOOL FOR SCALING IMPACT:  HOW SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS 
CAN MOBILIZE PRIVATE CAPITAL TO ADVANCE SOCIAL GOOD 32 (2012), available at 
http://www.socialfinanceus.org/sites/socialfinanceus.org/files/small.SocialFinanceWPSingle
FINAL_0.pdf. 
 22. See KRISTINA COSTA ET AL., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS:  SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS 
17 (2012), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/FAQ
SocialImpactBonds-1.pdf. 
 23. Drew von Glahn & Caroline Whistler, Translating Plain English:  Can the 
Peterborough Social Impact Bond Construct Apply Stateside?, COMMUNITY DEV. 
INVESTMENT REV., 2011, at 58. 
 24. See JEFFREY B. LIEBMAN, SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS:  A PROMISING NEW FINANCING 
MODEL TO ACCELERATE SOCIAL INNOVATION AND IMPROVE GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE 21 
(2011), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/02/
pdf/social_impact_bonds.pdf; von Glahn & Whistler, supra note 23, at 58, 61. 
 25. See JITINDER KOHLI ET AL., FACT SHEET:  SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS: A BRIEF 
INTRODUCTION TO A NEW FINANCING TOOL FOR SOCIAL PROGRAMS 2 (2012), available at 
http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2012/04/pdf/sib_fact_sheet.pdf. 
 26. See MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 2, at 22. 
 27. See id.  
 28. See Costa & Kohli, supra note 13. 
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healthcare,29 workforce development,30 and early education programs.31  
Accordingly, there are many possible applications for SIBs to assist the 
underprivileged and lessen the government’s burden. 
The question remains:  How can tax-exempt nonprofits participate in 
SIBs when federal laws deny tax-exempt status to organizations that confer 
substantial benefits on private interests not among the charitable class?32  
This Note will examine the impact of nonprofit SIB participation through 
analysis of the private benefit doctrine—the primary IRS method to police 
third-party profit taking.33  Despite the benefits to each SIB participant,34 
the arrangement is likely to implicate private benefit issues because private 
investors stand to receive their principal plus interest-like profits depending 
on the success of the nonprofit service providers.35 
Part I begins with an explanation of the relationship between the 
government and nonprofits by examining the contours of the federal tax 
exemption.  This Note then briefly examines the process for a nonprofit to 
obtain the federal tax exemption and focus on one of the main limitations 
on the exemption36—the private benefit doctrine.37  Next, this Note 
attempts to organize the various forms of private benefit identified by the 
IRS and the courts into three general categories.  Lastly, Part I explains the 
specifics of the SIB structure in detail, followed by an examination of the 
potential benefits and risks to the government, private investors, and 
nonprofits.   
Part II addresses this Note’s central issue:  how nonprofit participation in 
a SIB may violate the private benefit doctrine and result in the loss of the 
tax exemption.38  This part explains how SIBs present a challenge to the 
status quo of the private benefit doctrine, defying simple analogy to the 
 
 29. The city of Fresno is contemplating a SIB to reduce the rate of asthma-related 
emergencies. See Manuela Badawy, California City Seeks To Cut Asthma Rate via Bond 
Issue, REUTERS (Oct. 19, 2012, 10:50 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/19/us-
investing-impactbonds-health-idUSBRE89I0U120121019. 
 30. See KOHLI ET AL., supra note 10, at 2, 5. 
 31. See Chen, supra note 8. 
 32. See BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 537 (10th ed. 
2011). 
 33. See Darryll K. Jones, Third-Party Profit-Taking in Tax Exemption Jurisprudence, 
2007 B.Y.U. L. REV. 977, 984.  
 34. See discussion infra Part I.B.2. 
 35. Cf. Christopher C. Archer, Comment, Private Benefit for the Public Good:  
Promoting Foundation Investment in the “Fourth Sector” To Provide More Efficient and 
Effective Social Missions, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 159, 188 (2011). 
 36. This Note focuses on private benefit—the main issue that may arise for nonprofits 
participating in SIBs.  This Note does not address unrelated exemption limitations. 
 37. If a prohibited private benefit is found, a nonprofit will either lose its tax-exempt 
status or fail to qualify for the exemption. See HOPKINS, supra note 32, at 536–37. 
 38. This Note explores the question whether an impermissible private benefit occurs in 
SIBs; it does not purport to address what options may be available to nonprofits that do in 
fact lose or fail to qualify for the tax exemption.  For further discussion on the potential 
recourse available to such nonprofits, see generally Richard L. Schmalbeck, Declaratory 
Judgments and Charitable Borders (2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the 
Fordham Law Review). 
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established private benefit doctrine.  Part II compares the potential private 
benefit occurring in SIBs with the categories identified in Part I.A.3.  
Juxtaposing these recognized private benefit transactions with the new 
issues presented by SIBs will indicate whether the similarities are strong 
enough to fall within the outer limits of the doctrine.  Ultimately, this part 
seeks to answer the question:  Given what is known about the private 
benefit doctrine, would participation in a SIB jeopardize a nonprofit’s tax-
exempt status? 
Part III recommends how and why the private benefit doctrine should be 
modified to promote SIBs.  Finally, this part suggests methods to structure 
SIBs in a manner that could mitigate the private benefit threat. 
I.  OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTION & SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS 
This part of the Note covers two distinct topics.  Part I.A offers 
background on the federal tax exemption and the private benefit doctrine.  
Part I.B examines the SIB concept, highlighting how they are designed to 
be implemented and how they would impact the participants. 
A.  Tax-Exempt Status Requirements and the Private Benefit Doctrine 
First, this section describes how nonprofits operate and how the IRS 
awards the tax exemption.  Next, it details the private benefit doctrine as 
one of the main limitations on the federal tax exemption.  Finally, this 
section traces the development of the private benefit doctrine and organizes 
its application into several categories. 
1.  Federal Tax Exemption Basics 
What separates a nonprofit entity from a for-profit entity is that nonprofit 
entities cannot distribute profits for the private benefit of another person.39  
A nonprofit is an entity that is organized to pursue a recognized social 
purpose, while for-profits seek to further the economic interests of their 
owners.40  To establish a nonprofit, an organization must first be a 
corporation, charitable trust, unincorporated association, or limited liability 
company.41  Among these alternatives, each structure carries different 
documentation, governance, tax, and liability effects.42  Obtaining tax-
exempt status however, is an entirely separate undertaking.43 
 
 39. See EVELYN BRODY & JOHN TYLER, HOW PUBLIC IS PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY? 
SEPARATING REALITY FROM MYTH 18 (2d ed. 2012); see also Henry Hansmann, Economic 
Theories of Nonprofit Organization, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 27–28 (Walter W. Powell 
ed., 1987) (describing this limitation as the “nondistribution constraint”). 
 40. See CHERYL SOROKIN ET AL., NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT 3–4 (3d 
ed. 2011). 
 41. See LISA A. RUNQUIST, THE ABCS OF NONPROFITS 1–7 (2005). 
 42. See id. at 8–9. 
 43. See id. at ix. 
 3486 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
Contrary to common belief,44 nonprofits may be either taxable or tax 
exempt.45  Recognizing this distinction, it is important to note that not all 
nonprofits are tax exempt, but all tax-exempt organizations are nonprofits.46  
Obtaining and keeping the tax exemption is very important to nonprofit 
organizations due to the substantial advantages that come with it.47  First, 
nonprofits avoid the obligation to pay most taxes—allowing them to focus 
solely on providing services to beneficiaries.48  Second, certain tax-exempt 
organizations are permitted to receive tax-deductible contributions.49  This 
key fundraising tool is codified separately,50 but it carries essentially the 
same criteria as that required for the tax exemption.51  The deduction 
feature allows private individuals to pay less income and estate taxes when 
they donate, creating a strong incentive to support nonprofits.52  Finally, the 
federal tax exemption allows nonprofits to both issue bonds with tax-free 
interest, and achieve intangible benefits from an improved public image.53 
To receive the federal tax exemption, nonprofits must comply with 
section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) to gain approval from the 
IRS.54  Under section 501(a),55 nonprofits must be organized and operated 
for a specific philanthropic purpose and comply with section 501(c) to 
obtain the exemption.56  Specifically, the requirements for charitable or 
social service nonprofits57 are defined under section 501(c)(3).58  This 
“charitable” purpose that confers exempt status is intended to be divorced 
 
 44. The public often confuses the terms “nonprofit” and “tax-exempt,” assuming they 
share the same meaning. Evelyn Brody & Joseph J. Cordes, Tax Treatment of Nonprofit 
Organizations:  A Two-Edged Sword?, in NONPROFITS AND GOVERNMENT:  COLLABORATION 
AND CONFLICT 142 (Elizabeth T. Boris & C. Eugene Steuerle eds., 1999). 
 45. See BRODY & TYLER, supra note 39, at 17, 20. 
 46. See NICHOLAS P. CAFARDI & JACLYN FABEAN CHERRY, UNDERSTANDING NONPROFIT 
AND TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 2 (2006). 
 47. See SOROKIN ET AL., supra note 40, at 52. 
 48. See Brody & Cordes, supra note 44, at 142–44; see also Christyne J. Vachon, 
Blurring. Not Fading. Looking at the Duties of Care and Loyalty As Nonprofits Move into 
Commercialism, 12 TRANSACTIONS:  TENN. J. BUS. L. 37, 39–40 (2011). 
 49. Elizabeth T. Boris, Nonprofit Organizations in a Democracy:  Varied Roles and 
Responsibilities, in NONPROFITS AND GOVERNMENT:  COLLABORATION AND CONFLICT, supra 
note 44, at 4–5. 
 50. 26 I.R.C. § 170 (2006). 
 51. See BRODY & TYLER, supra note 39, at 55. 
 52. See Brody & Cordes, supra note 44, at 143. 
 53. See Peter Molk, Reforming Nonprofit Exemption Requirements, 17 FORDHAM J. 
CORP. & FIN. L. 475, 487 (2012). 
 54. See CAFARDI & CHERRY, supra note 46, at 63. 
 55. I.R.C. § 501(a). 
 56. Id. § 501(c). 
 57. Besides charitable nonprofits, other organizations are capable of receiving the 
federal tax exemption and are detailed in the other sections of 501(c). See SOROKIN ET AL., 
supra note 40, at 52 (listing the various tax-exempt organizations). 
 58. In relevant part, section 501(c)(3) states:  “Corporations, and any community chest, 
fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, 
testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, . . . no part of the net earnings of 
which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual . . . .” I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) 
(2006). 
 2013] THE PRIVATE BENEFIT DOCTRINE 3487 
from the pursuit of economic benefit for nonprofit founders and financial 
contributors.59  To support this legislative scheme on a local level, many 
states and municipalities extend tax-exempt status to nonprofits under 
criteria identical to the federal standards.60  Most states will extend the 
exemption to income and property taxes.61  As a monitoring mechanism, 
the IRS requires tax-exempt organizations to annually file a Form 990 to 
ensure that nonprofits continue to comply with the exemption 
requirements.62 
The policy justification for the tax exemption is “based upon the theory 
that the Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief 
from financial burdens which would otherwise have to be met by 
appropriations from other public funds.”63  In other words, nonprofits are 
able to obtain tax-exempt status because they provide the government with 
a “public benefit” by providing resources and services the government 
would otherwise have to finance with taxpayer money.64  Supplementing 
this rationale, there are four prevailing arguments in support of the 
government’s tolerance of tax-exempt organizations.65  Each of these 
theories is based on the assumption that a nonprofit’s activities will not 
confer individual economic wealth.66 
2.  Private Benefit Implications on the Tax Exemption 
Even if a nonprofit has a tax-exempt purpose under section 501(c)(3) and 
obtains tax-exempt status, “‘what the government giveth’ it can also take 
away.”67  There are certain transactions that can result in intermediate 
sanctions68 or a loss of the tax exemption.69  No statute or regulation 
 
 59. See Vachon, supra note 48, at 39–40. 
 60. See BRUCE R. HOPKINS & VIRGINIA C. GROSS, NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE:  LAW, 
PRACTICES, AND TRENDS 3 (2009); Brody & Cordes, supra note 44, at 142. 
 61. See Brody & Cordes, supra note 44, at 144. 
 62. See SOROKIN ET AL., supra note 40, at 52. 
 63. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 590 (1983) (quoting Congressional 
Hearings of the Revenue Act of 1938, H.R. Rep. 75-1869, at 19 (1938)). 
 64. See Barbara K. Bucholtz, Doing Well By Doing Good and Vise Versa:  Self-
Sustaining NGO/Nonprofit Organizations, 17. J.L. & POL’Y 403, 411 (2009). 
 65. The four theories are (1) Hansmann’s contract failure theory, (2) Atkinson’s altruism 
theory, (3) Colombo and Hall’s donative theory; and (4) Crimm’s risk compensation theory. 
See Darryll K. Jones, The Scintilla of Individual Profit:  In Search of Private Inurement and 
Excess Benefit, 19 VA. TAX REV. 575, 585–86 (2000). 
 66. See id. at 586.  For a further discussion, see generally Rob Atkinson, Theories of the 
Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charities:  Thesis, Antithesis, and Syntheses, 27 STETSON 
L. REV. 395 (1997). 
 67. Brody & Cordes, supra note 44, at 142. 
 68. The IRS can apply intermediate sanctions, in the form of penalty fees, to “excess 
benefit transactions” involving insiders rather than revoking the tax exemption. See I.R.C. 
§ 4958 (2006). 
 69. To maintain tax-exempt status, a nonprofit must report and pay taxes on unrelated 
business income and may not (1) engage in private inurement, (2) confer private benefit, or 
(3) participate in a political campaign or lobbying activities. See Gail A. Lasprogata & 
Marya N. Cotton, Contemplating “Enterprise”:  The Business and Legal Challenges of 
Social Entrepreneurship, 41 AM. BUS. L.J. 67, 76–77 (2003).  Put another way, these 
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explicitly defines “private benefit”; however, the doctrine is arguably 
grounded in Treasury Regulation section 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii).70  
According to the regulation, a nonprofit has the burden to prove “that it is 
not organized or operated for the benefit of private interests such as 
designated individuals, the creator or his family, shareholders of the 
organization, or persons controlled, directly or indirectly, by such private 
interests.”71  If a prohibited private benefit is found, the nonprofit’s tax-
exempt status may be denied or revoked.72  In fact, private benefit is one of 
the most common reasons for revocation of the exemption.73  The IRS can 
even apply this doctrine on the speculative belief that private benefit “might 
or could occur.”74 
The contours of the doctrine have developed over time.  Early cases in 
the 1970s interpreting the private benefit doctrine confused it with private 
inurement75 or failed to recognize it altogether.76  Later, the Tax Court 
defined a prohibited private benefit broadly as any “[a]dvantage; profit; 
fruit; privilege; gain; [or] interest.”77  These divergent interpretations 
underscored the early confusion surrounding the private benefit doctrine up 
until the late 1980s. 
In 1987, IRS General Counsel Memoranda (GCM) 39,59878 clearly 
separated private benefit from private inurement and roughly defined the 
 
requirements can be broken down into four main tests:  (1) the Organizational Test; (2) the 
Operational Test; (3) the Private Inurement Test; and (4) the Political Activities Test. See 
CAFARDI & CHERRY, supra note 46, at 63–84. 
 70. The private benefit doctrine is derived from Treasury Regulation section 1.501(c)(3), 
which states that an organization will not qualify as serving an exempt purposes “unless it 
serves a public rather than a private interest.” Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (as 
amended in 2008). See Jones, supra note 33, at 998; Jill S. Manny, Nonprofit Payments to 
Insiders and Outsiders:  Is the Sky the Limit?, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 735, 746 (2007). 
 71. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii). See, e.g., Basic Bible Church v. Comm’r, 74 
T.C. 846, 848 (1985) (illustrating how a nonprofit addressed this issue in its charter). 
 72. See RUNQUIST, supra note 41, at 70; MICHAEL I. SANDERS, JOINT VENTURES 
INVOLVING TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 5.1(a) (3d ed. 2007). 
 73. See RUNQUIST, supra note 41, at 86. 
 74. See HOPKINS & GROSS, supra note 60, at 17. 
 75. Private inurement occurs when income or assets from a tax-exempt organization 
flow to individuals with direct control over the organization. See Manny, supra note 70, at 
744, 746.  Private inurement is different from private benefit in three main respects 
(1) private inurement only applies to organizational insiders while private benefit applies 
also to disinterested persons; (2) private inurement is absolute and will not be excused for an 
insignificant amount while private benefit is permissible when incidental; (3) private 
inurement can result in the loss of tax-exempt status or intermediate sanctions, while private 
benefit may only result in the loss of tax-exempt status. See id.  For a broad discussion of the 
private inurement doctrine, see generally Jones, supra note 65. 
 76. See, e.g., Harding Hosp. v. United States, 505 F.2d 1068 (6th Cir. 1974); B.H.W. 
Anesthesia Found., Inc. v. Comm’r, 72 T.C. 681 (1979). 
 77. Retired Teachers Legal Fund v. Comm’r, 78 T.C. 280, 286 (1982). 
 78. In relevant part, the memo reads, 
An organization is not described in section 501(c)(3) if it serves a private interest 
more than incidentally . . . .  A private benefit is considered incidental only if it is 
incidental in both a qualitative and quantitative sense.  In order to be incidental in 
a qualitative sense, the benefit must be a necessary concomitant of the activity 
which benefits the public at large, i.e., the activity can be accomplished only by 
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scope of the doctrine.79  In the GCM, the IRS stated there is a line between 
a permissible incidental private benefit and a prohibited private benefit, 
dependent upon a weighing of the qualitative and quantitative nature of the 
benefit conferred.80 
Then, in 1989, the notable American Campaign Academy v. 
Commissioner81 case departed from the earlier unclear judicial treatment of 
the private benefit doctrine from the 1970s and early 1980s by recognizing 
private benefit as a distinct limitation on the federal tax exemption.82  In 
American Campaign Academy, the Tax Court essentially adopted the IRS’s 
functional test in GCM 39,59883 and noted that courts must examine private 
benefit independent from private inurement.84 
In 1999, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in United Cancer Council v. 
Commissioner85 further clarified the distinction between private inurement 
and private benefit.  In this case, a tax-exempt charity granted an exclusive 
fundraising contract to a for-profit entity, which ended up retaining $26.5 
million out of the $28.8 million that it raised.86  The Tax Court upheld the 
IRS’s revocation of the nonprofit’s tax-exempt status due to private 
inurement.87  On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed and rejected the 
prevailing argument that the private fundraising company should be 
considered an “insider” for private inurement purposes, concluding that the 
Tax Court should have conducted a private benefit analysis instead.88  
Judge Posner penned the decision and noted that “the usual ‘private benefit’ 
case is one in which the charity has dual public and private goals.”89  
However, this decision did little to clarify how the private benefit at issue 
should be analyzed.90 
The boundaries of the private benefit doctrine remain poorly defined.  
Noted nonprofit scholar John Colombo argues that the line between an 
incidental and prohibited private benefit remains hazy, describing it as an 
 
benefiting certain private individuals . . . .  To be incidental in a quantitative sense, 
the private benefit must not be substantial after considering the overall public 
benefit conferred by the activity. 
I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598 (Jan. 23, 1987) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  
 79. See John D. Colombo, Private Benefit:  What Is It—and What Do We Want It To 
Be? 1, 6–7 (2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). 
 80. See id.; see also Manny, supra note 70, at 746. 
 81. 92 T.C. 1053 (1989). 
 82. The court denied the exemption through recognition of an impermissible private 
benefit, despite an absence of any traditional indicia of private inurement. See id. at 1073–
79; see also Colombo, supra note 79, at 8. 
 83. See Colombo, supra note 79, at 8. 
 84. See Archer, supra note 35, at 180–81. 
 85. 165 F.3d 1173 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 86. Id. at 1174. 
 87. Id. at 1175. 
 88. Id. at 1179–80. 
 89. Id. at 1179. 
 90. The court left the private benefit determination to remand, but the district court never 
addressed the issue because the IRS entered into a settlement to resolve the dispute. See id.; 
SANDERS, supra note 72, at 294. 
 3490 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
amorphous “I know it when I see it” test91 that forces charities to “operate 
in analytical darkness.”92  Further, since the 1989 decision in American 
Campaign Academy, the private benefit doctrine has become the IRS’s 
primary tool to “police the activities of charitable organizations under Code 
Section 501(c)(3).”93  The IRS’s eagerness to utilize the private benefit 
doctrine, coupled with the doctrine’s ambiguity, puts significant pressure on 
tax-exempt nonprofits when contemplating transactions with private parties. 
There have been several rationales advanced to support the use of the 
private benefit doctrine.  At a superficial level, the doctrine is very closely 
related to the nonprofit prohibition of profit distributions.94  Basic tax-
exempt nonprofit policy dictates that organizations should operate for a 
public benefit rather than a private one in order to justify their exemption.95  
One scholar recognizes the evolution of the private benefit doctrine as a 
means to ensure that tax-exempt nonprofits remain true to their charitable 
purpose and avoid excessive commercialization.96  Tax Professor Darryll 
Jones views the private benefit doctrine as a means to “distinguish[] 
charitable endeavors from other endeavors not deserving tax-exemption.”97  
Professor Colombo argues that the private benefit doctrine is a method to 
ensure that nonprofits remain committed to the pursuit of charity and serve 
a broad charitable class.98  Renowned economist and nonprofit policy 
expert, Burton Weisbrod, suggests that the private benefit doctrine 
developed as a means for the IRS to police nonprofits that have become 
“for-profits in disguise,” where serving the charitable purpose has become a 
secondary goal.99  Judge Posner offered another interpretation in United 
Cancer Council, stating that the private benefit doctrine could be used as a 
way to guard nonprofits against “bad deals” with for-profit entities.100  
Despite these varied policy arguments, they share the common goal of 
protecting the nonprofit’s charitable purpose against intrusions from private 
interests. 
 
 91. See Colombo, supra note 79, at 2. 
 92. See John D. Colombo, In Search of Private Benefit, 58 FLA. L. REV. 1063, 1105 
(2006). 
 93. Colombo, supra note 79, at 1; see Jones, supra note 33, at 984. 
 94. See Darryll K. Jones, “First Bite” and the Private Benefit Doctrine:  A Comment on 
Temporary and Proposed Regulation 53.4958-4T(A)(3), 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 715, 718 (2001). 
 95. See SANDERS, supra note 72, at 46. 
 96. See Vachon, supra note 48, at 37. 
 97. See Jones, supra note 65, at 615–16. 
 98. See Colombo, supra note 92, at 1081. 
 99. See Burton A. Weisbrod, The Nonprofit Mission and Its Financing:  Growing Links 
Between Nonprofits and the Rest of the Economy, in TO PROFIT OR NOT TO PROFIT:  THE 
COMMERCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 11 (Burton A. Weisbrod ed., 
1998) (citation omitted). 
 100. See Colombo, supra note 79, at 21. 
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3.  Different Categories of Private Benefit Transactions 
As the doctrine has developed, certain interactions with private parties101 
can be organized into three general categories of private benefit 
transactions:  (1) incidental private benefit, (2) likely private benefit, and 
(3) joint venture private benefit.  Incidental private benefit transactions are 
not prohibited and do not destroy the tax exemption.102  The IRS and courts 
have also identified certain transactions likely to violate the private benefit 
doctrine and have employed an entirely different framework to analyze 
private benefit in joint ventures.103 
a.  Incidental Private Benefit 
If a transaction falls within the first category—incidental private 
benefit—a nonprofit will not lose its tax-exempt status.104  This inquiry is 
guided by the balancing test in GCM 39,598, where the IRS introduced the 
dual qualitative and quantitative requirements.105  In the memo, the IRS 
explained that “[i]f an activity serves both exempt and nonexempt purposes, 
the organization will be exempt only if the predominant motivation 
underlying the activity is an exempt purpose.”106  A transaction will be 
considered qualitatively incidental if the public benefit cannot be achieved 
without necessarily benefiting private individuals.107  The quantitative 
prong is satisfied when the private benefit is insubstantial in relation to the 
public benefit conferred by the specific activity undertaken, not the overall 
public benefit accomplished by the nonprofit.108  Neither the IRS nor the 
courts applying this balancing test have announced any bright-line methods 
to measure these factors.109 
As a result, the IRS has much discretion when utilizing the qualitative 
and quantitative balancing test to determine incidental private benefit.110  
There are numerous examples of IRS rulings where an incidental private 
benefit is either found111 or rejected112 without establishing any clear 
 
 101. The list that follows is not exhaustive as the IRS has issued numerous revenue 
rulings with varied approaches to the private benefit analysis.  The categories discussed 
cover the main instances of private benefit identified by scholars. 
 102. See Manny, supra note 70, at 745–46. 
 103. See discussion infra Parts I.A.3.b–c. 
 104. See Archer, supra note 35, at 178. 
 105. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598 (Jan. 23, 1987). 
 106. Id. 
 107. See SANDERS, supra note 72, at 45, 281–82. 
 108. See id. at 45. 
 109. See HOPKINS, supra note 32, at 538–40 (discussing the application of the incidental 
balancing test). 
 110. See id. at 540. 
 111. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 70-186, 1970-1 C.B. 129; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 06-06-042 (Feb. 
10, 2006); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 01-03-083 (Jan. 19, 2001); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-15-030 
(Apr. 12, 1996). 
 112. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 77-206, 1977-1 C.B. 149; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 09-44-053 (Oct. 
30, 2009); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 08-49-017 (Dec. 5, 2008). 
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guidelines how the qualitative or quantitative prongs were weighed, 
essentially “leaving [nonprofits] completely at sea.”113  Since the balancing 
test from GCM 39,598 is not a mandatory method to analyze incidental 
private benefit, the malleable nature of the doctrine allows the IRS to assess 
private benefit in a very pliable manner.114  Accordingly, the IRS has 
generously dismissed private benefit as incidental in some circumstances 
and aggressively sought tax exemption revocation in others.115 
b.  Likely Private Benefit 
There are certain general nonprofit financial activities that may violate 
the private benefit doctrine.  Tax-exempt nonprofits cannot have 
stockholders or provide equity distributions like dividends.116  Nonprofits 
have more flexibility when it comes to debt instruments.117  Issuing loans 
from a nonprofit’s charitable assets to private parties will only result in a 
prohibited private benefit if the terms are unreasonable and the loan fails to 
further an exempt purpose.118  Also, nonprofits can issue sophisticated tax-
exempt bonds without violating the private benefit doctrine as long as less 
than 10 percent of the proceeds are diverted to noncharitable individual 
use.119 
Shared revenue stream arrangements between nonprofits and private 
entities were identified as a likely violation of the private benefit doctrine in 
GCM 39,862.120  The IRS explained that a revenue-sharing agreement 
between a tax-exempt hospital and a number of affiliated doctors ran afoul 
of the private benefit doctrine.121  The planned arrangement specified that 
the hospital would cede control of certain facilities to the doctors in return 
for a share of their profits in the hopes of increasing the hospital’s overall 
referrals and revenues.122  The hospital’s exemption was revoked since the 
private benefit from the shared revenue stream agreement could not be 
considered incidental to the concurrent public benefit to the community.123  
This decision mirrored older iterations of the private benefit where, despite 
the fact that a charitable purpose was served, the benefit to private interests 
 
 113. Colombo, supra note 92, at 1065. 
 114. See Jones, supra note 94, at 724–25 (describing the IRS’s “informal articulation” of 
the incidental balancing test). 
 115. See HOPKINS, supra note 32, at 540. 
 116. See id. at 523. 
 117. See SANDERS, supra note 72, at 290. 
 118. See id. 
 119. This 10 percent threshold can be higher when the private noncharitable use is 
necessary to accomplish a public benefit. See Darryll K. Jones, Restating the Private Benefit 
Doctrine for a Brave New World, 1 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 23 (2003). 
 120. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991). 
 121. See SANDERS, supra note 72, at 295. 
 122. See Colombo, supra note 92, at 1074. 
 123. See SANDERS, supra note 72, at 295. 
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was too great to be considered incidental, and the tax exemption was 
forfeited.124 
The IRS has also identified circular cash flow arrangements as an 
impermissible private benefit.  In Revenue Ruling 2006-27, the IRS 
analyzed an agreement where a tax-exempt organization received money 
from individual home sellers and later used that money to provide down 
payment assistance to poor individuals to buy the home sellers’ 
properties.125  Although the nonprofit served an exempt purpose benefitting 
the poor, the IRS found the arrangement violated the private benefit 
doctrine in light of the circular cash flow—the money transfer from the 
home sellers to the nonprofit to the poor buyers and then back again to the 
sellers.126  Professor Colombo has suggested that there must be a deeper 
motivation behind Revenue Ruling 2006-27 because there is nothing 
inherently wrong when nonprofits act as a “conduit to connect needy 
families with housing sellers.”127  Colombo contrasts the perceived 
innocence of this transaction with a situation where a nonprofit is used as a 
“front” to increase a seller’s market share through exploiting the charitable 
class.128 
When a private purpose dominates a nonprofit’s operation, the tax 
exemption may be revoked despite a coexisting charitable purpose.129  
Similar to Professor Weisbrod’s private benefit policy rationale,130 the IRS 
may utilize the private benefit doctrine when the tax-exempt purpose 
becomes secondary to private interests.131  In American Campaign 
Academy, the Tax Court noted that even if a nonprofit serves a valid tax-
exempt purpose, when there is a substantial “secondary” benefit, the 
nonprofit will not qualify as a tax-exempt organization.132  Clarifying this 
stance, the court noted that the tax exemption would be lost if secondary 
beneficial effects are “earmarked for a particular organization or person.”133 
The IRS has established that, when secondary benefits are broadly 
distributed to a variety of organizations or individuals, the benefits will be 
considered incidental.134  The reciprocal argument holds that if a secondary 
benefit is consistently conferred to a single entity it will always be 
“substantial” and improper.135  The IRS raised this reciprocal argument in 
American Campaign Academy and, while the Tax Court did not accept this 
 
 124. See Jones, supra note 33, at 991. 
 125. See Rev. Rul. 06-27, 06-1 C.B. 915. 
 126. See Colombo, supra note 92, at 1080. 
 127. See id. at 1096. 
 128. See id. at 1097. 
 129. See SANDERS, supra note 72, at 281.  
 130. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
 131. See SANDERS, supra note 72, at 282–83.  
 132. See Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1053, 1073–74 (1989). 
 133. Id. at 1074. 
 134. See SANDERS, supra note 72, at 45, 283 (explaining that the Academy had provided 
benefits to a concentrated group of individuals, eventually resulting in the loss of their tax-
exempt status). 
 135. See Jones, supra note 33, at 1002. 
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proposition, the court has consistently deferred to the IRS following this 
case.136 
While the courts have not utilized the secondary benefit analysis since 
American Campaign Academy, some practitioners have raised concerns that 
it could be applied in other situations; however, tax lawyer Michael Sanders 
believes this framework will only be utilized on a limited basis in similar 
situations.137  Professor Colombo takes a more skeptical stance on 
American Campaign Academy, stating the decision simply “makes no 
sense,”138 echoing the legal community’s view that the case was decided 
incorrectly.139 
Aside from the likely private benefit transactions already discussed, the 
IRS’s Treasury Regulation section 1.501(c)(3)-(d)(1)(iii) spells out three 
examples that would violate the private benefit doctrine.140 
The regulation’s first example focuses on the basic question of whether 
the charitable class is sufficiently large enough that the nonprofit is 
providing a public benefit rather than an impermissible private benefit to 
select individuals.141  This form of private benefit closely mirrors the 
definition of a “charity,” which requires a nonprofit to provide services that 
benefit the community at large.142  This simple charitable class-size inquiry 
served as the basis for the private benefit doctrine up until the late 1970s.143  
Similar to the 1978 Callaway Family Ass’n v. Commissioner144 decision, 
the first example states that an impermissible private benefit would occur 
when tax-exempt educational nonprofits primarily serve the private interests 
of a single family.145  The courts have applied this concept beyond the 
education industry, as the Third Circuit in Geisinger Health Plan v. 
Commissioner146 ruled an HMO was not entitled to tax-exempt status, 
because it only provided benefits to its members and not the greater 
community.147 
In the second example, the regulation notes that the private benefit 
doctrine would be violated in transactions initiated by nonprofits that result 
in grossly disproportionate private commissions.148  Much like the first 
 
 136. See id. at 1002 n.112. 
 137. See SANDERS, supra note 72, at 45, 283–84 (“The IRS will most likely limit the 
holding in American Campaign Academy, with regard to its application of the secondary 
benefit concept, to similar fact patterns.”). 
 138. See Colombo, supra note 92, at 1099. 
 139. See SANDERS, supra note 72, at 283–84.  
 140. See HOPKINS, supra note 32, at 545 (describing the content and application of the 
examples listed in the regulation). 
 141. See JODY BLAZEK, TAX PLANNING AND COMPLIANCE FOR TAX-EXEMPT 
ORGANIZATIONS:  RULES, CHECKLISTS, PROCEDURES 514 (4th ed. 2004). 
 142. See Jones, supra note 65, at 615–17. 
 143. See Colombo, supra note 92, at 1069. 
 144. 71 T.C. 340 (1978). 
 145. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(iii) (as amended in 2008). 
 146. 985 F.2d 1210 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 147. See id. at 1219. 
 148. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(iii). 
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example, prior precedent served as the basis for this example.  In St. Louis 
Science Fiction Ltd. v. Commissioner,149 the Tax Court found a tax-exempt 
nonprofit was impermissibly operated for private benefit when it paid back 
85 percent of the sale price of artwork to the private artists and dealers that 
had supplied the products.150  Following closely from this case and a 
previous IRS ruling,151 the second regulatory example states a categorical 
private benefit would occur if a nonprofit sells artwork to the public and 
retains only a 10 percent commission while returning 90 percent of the 
value to the individual artists.152 
The third example concerns a professional training education program 
that violates the private benefit doctrine.153  The example details an 
arrangement where a tax-exempt nonprofit’s sole responsibility is to carry 
out training exercises while the for-profit entity controls the rights to any 
course materials developed and sets the price of tuition.154 
While these regulatory examples spell out certain instances where private 
benefit definitely occurs, Professor Colombo argues that these three narrow 
examples fail to establish the limits of the doctrine and are too varied to 
give proper guidance to analyze other types of transactions.155  If one were 
to merely read the three examples listed, the problems inherent in equity 
distributions, revenue sharing agreements, circular cash flows, and 
impermissible secondary benefits are not evident and could be easily 
overlooked.156 
c.  Joint Venture Private Benefit 
When nonprofits engage in joint ventures with for-profit entities they will 
usually fail the incidental balancing test; however, in this case, the 
exemption is not automatically lost because the IRS analyzes the private 
benefit under a separate framework.157  While the IRS initially considered 
joint ventures with for-profit entities a per se private benefit,158 the 
Plumstead Theatre Society, Inc. v. Commissioner159 decision rejected this 
stance160 and served as the basis for later doctrinal development.  Although 
there was a limited partnership agreement between a nonprofit and a for-
 
 149. 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 1126 (1985). 
 150. See id. at 1128. 
 151. See Rev. Rul. 76-152, 1976-1 C.B. 151 (denying a tax exemption to an art gallery 
engaged in excessive private benefit for transmitting 90 percent of the sale price to a small 
number of artists). 
 152. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(iii). 
 153. See id. 
 154. See Colombo, supra note 92, at 1104. 
 155. See id. at 1065. 
 156. While the preceding list of transactions that are likely to result in private benefit is 
not exhaustive, it does illustrate the broad reach of the doctrine. 
 157. See Colombo, supra note 92, at 1078. 
 158. See Nicholas A. Mirkay, Relinquish Control! Why the IRS Should Change Its Stance 
on Exempt Organizations in Ancillary Joint Ventures, 6 NEV. L.J. 21, 35–36 (2006). 
 159. 74 T.C. 1324 (1980). 
 160. Id. at 1330–31. 
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profit corporation in Plumstead, the court ruled that there was no private 
benefit violation since the for-profit entity was paid a reasonable price and 
had no control over the tax-exempt nonprofit.161  The decision forced the 
IRS to accept the principle that joint ventures between private parties and 
tax-exempt nonprofits are compatible in some instances.162  Since 
Plumstead, the IRS has adopted a cautious approach where it “closely 
scrutinizes” situations where a nonprofit participates in a partnership or 
joint venture with a for-profit entity.163 
In GCM 39,005, the IRS established a two part test to determine private 
benefit in joint ventures by examining (1) whether the objective of the joint 
venture serves or furthers the exempt organization’s charitable purpose, and 
(2) if the partnership allows the tax exempt organization to act exclusively 
for their exempt purpose and not for the benefit of the for-profit partners.164  
Essentially, this memo introduced another functional test to determine 
whether a prohibited private benefit occurs in joint ventures with for-profit 
entities by comparing the public benefits with the private benefits that 
individual investors accumulate.165  However, in the late 1990s, the two-
part private benefit analysis from GCM 39,005 was partially abandoned in 
favor of different standards for whole-entity joint ventures and ancillary 
joint ventures.166 
In the context of whole-entity joint ventures—where a nonprofit commits 
all of its assets to a joint venture with a for-profit entity—the issue of 
whether nonprofits could retain their exemption was addressed in Revenue 
Ruling 98-15.167  In the ruling, the IRS added an additional factor to the 
original two-part test, stating the private benefit determination depends on 
an analysis of whether (1) a charitable purpose is being served, (2) the 
nonprofit is able to act exclusively in furtherance of the charitable purpose 
and not for the benefit of the for-profit parties, and (3) the nonprofit 
maintains control over the joint venture’s management.168 
Embracing the Revenue Ruling 98-15 analysis, the Tax Court in 
Redlands Surgical Services v. Commissioner169 roughly adopted the IRS’s 
position.170  In Redlands, the court upheld the IRS’s decision to deny the 
exemption due to the occurrence of an impermissible private benefit.171  
Specifically, the court noted how the tax-exempt nonprofit had “ceded 
effective control” over the joint venture, resulting in a significant private 
benefit to the for-profit partners who were able to put personal gains ahead 
 
 161. See id. at 1333–34. 
 162. See Jones, supra note 33, at 992. 
 163. See SANDERS, supra note 72, at 291–92. 
 164. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,005 (June 28, 1983). 
 165. See Colombo, supra note 79, at 6–7. 
 166. See id. at 12–13. 
 167. See SANDERS, supra note 72, at 14. 
 168. See id. at 14–16; Mirkay, supra note 158, at 23, 42. 
 169. 113 T.C. 47 (1999). 
 170. See Archer, supra note 35, at 183. 
 171. See Redlands, 113 T.C. at 78. 
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of charitable purposes.172  While the lack of control in Redlands was 
dispositive and resulted in the revocation of the exemption, the court stated 
that it did not “view [this] one factor as crucial.”173  The Fifth Circuit in St. 
David’s Health Care System v. United States174 took a narrower view 
focused on the control prong, deciding that a per se private benefit occurs 
when a tax-exempt nonprofit lacks majority voting control in a joint venture 
with a for-profit entity.175  Both of these decisions indicate that the courts 
have accepted the IRS’s expansion of the private benefit doctrine beyond 
GCM 39,005 and adopted the Revenue Ruling 98-15 framework, which 
includes the control factor.176 
The IRS further refined its private benefit analysis for nonprofit joint 
ventures with private entities in Revenue Ruling 2004-51.177  Apart from 
the whole-entity joint venture analysis, the IRS introduced a different 
approach for ancillary joint ventures—where nonprofit involvement may be 
significant but falls short of requiring total asset contribution.178  In the 
ruling, the IRS determined that a tax-exempt university engaging in a joint 
venture with a for-profit company to provide supplemental educational 
services would not lose its exemption because the school’s participation 
only constituted an insubstantial portion of its activities.179  This decision 
suggests that ancillary joint ventures are distinct from whole-entity joint 
ventures and typically will not endanger the federal tax exemption when the 
enterprise does not constitute a substantial part of a nonprofit’s activities.180 
Revenue Ruling 2004-51 has also been interpreted to dispose of the 
control requirement for ancillary joint ventures, an important distinction 
versus whole-entity joint ventures.181  Despite this, doubts remain over the 
precedential value of this ruling.182  Notably, the IRS did not explicitly use 
the private benefit doctrine in Revenue Ruling 2004-51’s exemption 
analysis, although it was clearly at issue.183  This inconsistency has been 
debated among legal academics, leading to divergent explanations.184  Tax 
Professor Nicholas Mirkay embraces a straightforward interpretation, 
arguing that the IRS is not concerned with joint venture control when 
participation is only a minor part of a nonprofit’s activities.185  Professor 
Colombo offers a slightly more complex interpretation, stating that the 
control analysis is relaxed when nonprofits retain control over the charitable 
 
 172. See Mirkay, supra note 158, at 45. 
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portions of the joint venture.186  However, the ancillary joint venture private 
benefit analysis remains mainly speculative, as it appears the IRS was 
attempting to avoid establishing a clear precedent in Revenue Ruling 2004-
51.187 
In sum, when nonprofits engage in joint ventures with for-profit entities, 
they can expect the IRS will closely scrutinize the arrangement.188  Despite 
this, the different approaches to analyze whole-entity and ancillary joint 
ventures both allow some nonprofits to retain their exemption when private 
interests do not dominate the charitable purpose. 
B.  Social Impact Bonds and the Relationships Between the 
Private Investors, the Government, and the Nonprofits 
This section will provide an overview of the prevailing SIB framework.  
After it details the mechanics of how SIBs are designed to operate, the 
section will discuss each participant’s various benefits and risks. 
1.  Social Impact Bond Overview 
A SIB189 is a new financing mechanism190 where nonprofits are able to 
scale-up their operations through funding provided by private investors who 
stand to make a return—paid out by the government—if the nonprofits’ 
outreach work successfully accomplishes predetermined benchmarks.191  In 
the prevailing model,192 a SIB is an arrangement between private investors, 
social service nonprofits, government administrators, and an independent 
assessor.193  Under a SIB agreement, nonprofits receive a long-term funding 
commitment to implement or expand a social program capable of delivering 
large, quantifiable savings to a local, state, or federal government 
agency.194  Private investors provide the money to support the program by 
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allowing nonprofits to draw down funds throughout the term of the SIB.195  
In turn, the participating government agency agrees to repay the investors, 
plus a variable interest if the preselected benchmarks, monitored by an 
independent assessor, are fulfilled by the end of the SIB term.196  If the 
program falls short of the benchmarks, the investors lose their money, but 
the government escapes with no financial penalty, avoiding costs on the 
taxpayers.197  If the program is successful, the government saves money, 
investors make money, and the charitable class benefits from the expansion 
of nonprofit operations and implementation of the SIB.198  At the 
conclusion of the SIB, the government may continue to support the 
participating nonprofits by either funding them directly or executing 
another SIB.199 
The first ever SIB was developed for the Peterborough Prison in the 
United Kingdom and was established in a September 2010 agreement 
between a collection of philanthropic investors,200 four U.K. nonprofits led 
by Social Finance,201 and the U.K. Justice Ministry.202  The investors 
provided roughly $8 million203 in funding to implement a program designed 
to help former inmates adapt to life after confinement.204  If the nonprofits 
are able to reduce the recidivism rates of Peterborough’s former short-term 
prisoners, the investors will be repaid their initial investment plus up to 13 
percent interest.205  While the term ends in 2018 and the data will not be 
partially analyzed until 2014,206 the Peterborough SIB was seen as a good 
template for replication in the United States.207  This proved true two years 
later in the similarly structured Rikers Island SIB.208 
SIBs “flip [the] traditional government funding structures [for nonprofits] 
on their head,” allowing the government to only commit funds to successful 
social programs, instead of paying nonprofits upfront, regardless of the 
outcome.209  This presents an entirely new method for the government to 
support nonprofits without excessive risk to taxpayers.  Investors bear the 
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chief financial risk when implementing a SIB, while the government is only 
required to commit funds when public savings have been achieved from the 
successful completion of the desired SIB outcomes.210  SIBs are clearly 
distinguishable from the conventional sources of nonprofit funding, such as 
when the government provides grants to or contracts directly with 
nonprofits to provide services to desired communities.211  While the SIB 
concept is still in its infancy, and it is unclear how well they will work and 
how widely they will be implemented, SIBs offer strong incentives to each 
of the three main participants—investors, government agencies, and 
nonprofits.212 
2.  The Participants 
 This section will examine the likely SIB participants and the inherent 
benefits and risks associated with entering into a SIB.  
a.  Investors 
Initially, the investors who are likely to provide the capital in SIBs are 
either philanthropic investors or private investors willing to take a higher 
level of risk at below market returns.213  Interested investors should also 
have a high risk tolerance and interest in social benefit instead of pure 
financial returns214 because SIBs essentially carry “equity-like risk with 
bond-like returns.”215  Some have taken an optimistic outlook on SIBs, as 
the head of global wealth and retirement solutions at Bank of America 
Merrill Lynch, Andrew Seig, stated, “I’m very bullish about the concept of 
social impact bonds.”216  Also, risk can be hedged in SIBs through the use 
of a guarantee similar to the one utilized in the Rikers Island SIB.217  On the 
other hand, with no clear revenue streams to support a SIB, some investors 
will be hesitant to participate until the model becomes more standardized 
and proves to be a worthwhile bet.218 
Financing a SIB offers an attractive blended investment—allowing 
investors to achieve a meaningful social impact and net financial returns.219  
Even if the SIB fails to reach its minimum targets, investors will have 
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contributed funds in a philanthropic manner to support social projects 
aimed to improve the lives of vulnerable individuals.220  Such giving could 
result in positive externalities in light of studies that have suggested 
corporate social responsibility contributions end up conferring a beneficial 
effect on bottom-line profits from normal operations.221  Goldman Sachs 
has publicly stated that it views the participation in the Rikers Island SIB as 
an investment;222 however, they have also received much positive press as a 
result of the SIB and commentators have noted the potential publicity 
benefits from participation.223 
There are also several downsides facing potential investors in SIBs.  
Since the financial risk of funding nonprofits shifts from the government to 
the investors in SIBs, the investors remain exposed to a major loss if the 
SIB fails.224  By virtue of the conventional SIB structure, investors stand to 
lose their entire capital contribution if the nonprofits do not reach the preset 
benchmarks.225  Investors can approach this risk in two manners.  First, if 
the SIB investment fails, it could simply be written off as a loss, yet 
participation would still have a positive reputational impact akin to 
conventional philanthropic giving.226  Alternatively, at the outset, investors 
could seek to add a guarantor, limiting their downside to only a portion of 
their overall SIB investment.227 
b.  Government 
SIBs are an option for federal, state, or local government 
administrators.228  However, since most social service programs in the 
United States are funded at the state and local level, it is more likely that 
city and state governments will implement SIBs.229  To get SIBs off the 
ground, strong executive leadership from a government official is noted as a 
key component.230  For example, Mayor Bloomberg championed the Rikers 
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Island SIB and also leveraged his own nonprofit to guarantee a large 
portion of the investment at risk.231  Likewise, Massachusetts Governor 
Deval Patrick has publicly supported SIBs and is in the process of arranging 
several for the state.232 
As previously mentioned, SIBs provide a notable advantage to the 
government—eliminating responsibility for the financial risk in funding 
nonprofits.233  If the benchmarks for measuring government savings are 
properly measured and the interest premiums are properly structured, the 
government agency will never spend more than it saves when participating 
in a SIB.234  If the SIB fails, the government would be cash neutral, as they 
would not be obligated to repay the investors.235  If the SIB succeeds, the 
government would only provide the investors a portion of the savings 
achieved by the social work.236  This is especially valuable during periods 
of fiscal constraint, where nonprofit funding might otherwise be cut 
altogether.237 
SIBs allow the government to transition from supporting remedial 
programs to less costly preventive solutions,238 such as the programs 
designed to reduce recidivism rates.  The government’s taxpayers also 
benefit from SIBs since private investors provide capital for social 
programs, which the government might have otherwise paid for itself.239  
Further tax savings would occur if the preventive programs financed by the 
SIBs allow the government to reduce their obligations, such as closing 
unused portions of a prison.240 
While SIBs present a number of benefits to the government, there are 
some issues that must be considered prior to agreeing to a SIB.  The most 
difficult aspect of forming a SIB is to properly define measureable 
outcomes that will translate into tangible savings—a primary incentive for 
government participation.241  While a SIB is intended to avoid saddling the 
government with a net loss, the government agency may end up with an 
opportunity cost:  paying more than it would in a conventional nonprofit 
service contract.242  The diffuse benefit problem has been identified as 
another issue—where it may be difficult for a government agency to 
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determine realized cash savings because the benefits of a SIB may accrue to 
multiple levels of government, not just the participant.243  This diffuse 
benefit problem becomes more of an issue for programs serving 
underprivileged groups, such as the homeless, where the federal, state, and 
local governments often share funding responsibilities.244  Lastly, some 
government officials have expressed concern that participation could lead to 
a public backlash, viewing the arrangement as a way to give government 
savings away to wealthy investors.245 
c.  Nonprofits 
The nonprofits selected to provide services in SIBs are likely to be those 
that have previously qualified for government contracts.246  Investors will 
favor providing capital to nonprofits with a strong reputation or those with 
an easily traceable program in place, since unproven intervention programs 
carry additional risk.247  SIBs are well tailored to benefit nonprofits with a 
proven track record by allowing them to significantly scale-up their 
operations by providing access to a secure source of long-term funding.248 
Fundraising is crucial to the viability of many nonprofits.249  Nonprofits 
face the chronic problem of finding new and consistent sources of revenue 
beyond private and governmental donors.250  Further exacerbating this 
challenge, traditional sources of funding251 for nonprofits have been in 
decline for the past two decades.252  Private donations, as a percentage of 
total nonprofit revenue, have decreased since the late 1970s, and donations 
have failed to keep pace with inflation for some human service 
nonprofits.253  Despite cuts in government spending and declines in 
philanthropic donations since the 2008 financial crisis, the number of 
nonprofits created has continued to grow, which further constricts funding 
options in the industry.254  As a result of this decreased federal spending 
and increased competition for public and private donations, nonprofits have 
been encouraged to find new sources of financing.255  These economic and 
political developments have forced nonprofits to become more 
entrepreneurial, resorting to increased commercial operations or even 
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considering entering into joint ventures with private corporations.256  While 
these entrepreneurial possibilities have broadened nonprofit funding 
options, it places nonprofits at risk of incurring federal tax liability257 or 
losing their tax-exempt status.258 
SIBs have introduced a new and exciting source of entrepreneurial 
funding that could mark a revolution in the way nonprofits are financed.259  
Nonprofits that participate in SIBs gain access to a consistent source of 
funding throughout the term of the program, without fear of potential 
interruptions such as governmental budget cuts.260  Further, if the SIB is 
successful, the managing nonprofit potentially stands to gain a share of the 
governmental savings, depending on how the SIB is structured.261  Aside 
from the potential loss of compensation262 and reputational damage263 when 
a nonprofit fails to meet the SIB benchmarks, nonprofit participation carries 
a far more serious risk—the potential loss of tax-exempt status.264 
II.  HOW NONPROFITS PARTICIPATING IN SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS MAY 
VIOLATE THE PRIVATE BENEFIT DOCTRINE 
This part discusses the potential clash between the profits paid to 
investors in SIBs and the private benefit doctrine.  Part II.A discusses the 
specifics of how the private benefit doctrine could be an issue for nonprofits 
participating in SIBs.  Parts II.B–D then analyze how the private benefit 
issue in SIBs compares with the different categories of private benefit 
identified in Part I.A.3.  Lastly, Part II.E offers some conclusions from the 
preceding analysis. 
A.  The Inherent Private Benefit Problem in Social Impact Bonds 
Professor Colombo recently stated, “I fear the IRS sees every innovative 
deal between an exempt charity and some third party outside the charitable 
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class as an issue of private benefit.”265  In fact, most of the private benefit 
cases occur when nonprofits enter contractual relationships with for-profits 
that confer economic benefits to the for-profit organization.266  For 
participating nonprofits, SIBs are not a simple, no-strings-attached source 
of funding, considering that the investors agree to provide financing 
conditioned on the expectation of positive returns on the project.267 
The question that arises in the context of SIBs is whether or not the 
investor’s returns, which derive from the successful work of nonprofits in 
the SIB, equate to a distribution of profits akin to other transactions that 
result in an impermissible private benefit.  It seems similar to what Judge 
Posner described as “the usual ‘private benefit’ case . . . in which the 
charity has dual public and private goals.”268  In light of this uncertainty, 
participating in a SIB may place nonprofits in an uncomfortable position.  If 
a nonprofit accepts, it might lose its tax-exempt status.  If a nonprofit 
declines, it would be turning down a major source of funding that would 
allow the organization to impact far more lives and obtain greater 
recognition. 
To gain a better idea of how engaging in SIBs may result in a prohibited 
private benefit, the following sections compare the effect of participating in 
a SIB with the various forms of private benefit discussed in Part I.A.3.  It is 
unclear whether only successful SIBs would raise private benefit concerns, 
since if the benchmarks are not met at the end of the SIB term, the private 
investors would lose their investment and incur a loss.269  If the IRS adopts 
an ex ante approach to analyze the private benefit, examining the SIB’s 
prospective value and initial expected payout, it is less likely that there 
would be an impermissible private benefit.270  Even if the IRS uses the 
more restrictive ex post analysis—focusing retrospectively on the interest 
paid in successful SIBs—it is debatable whether these investor “profits” 
would violate the private benefit doctrine.  There is a strong argument that 
the profits which investors stand to earn in SIBs are entirely divorced from 
private benefit concerns since the profits flow from governmental savings 
rather than directly from nonprofit operations.271  Only if we are to believe 
that the “profits” occurring in SIBs are similar enough to direct payments 
from nonprofits to third parties does the private benefit issue persist.  
Considering these arguments to the contrary, while it may be difficult for 
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the IRS to determine that SIB participation would violate the private benefit 
doctrine, they could conceivably analyze the issue in the following manner. 
B.  Comparison of Social Impact Bonds with Incidental 
Private Benefit Transactions 
To begin the private benefit analysis, the SIB structure should be 
measured against the balancing test to determine whether the potential 
investor profits should be considered incidental.272  Since the IRS has 
acknowledged that tax-exempt nonprofits may generate incidental private 
benefits and retain their exemption, the balancing test offers a threshold 
determination that can eliminate the need for further private benefit 
analysis.273  Although the balancing test remains shrouded in ambiguity,274 
assessing SIBs within the framework could be illustrative of how the IRS 
would view the private benefit issue. 
To pass the qualitative incidental benefit prong, the private benefit 
occurring must be necessary to achieve a charitable public benefit.275  SIBs 
seem to satisfy this requirement.  In SIBs, the private benefit, in the form of 
profits to private investors, is tied directly to the success of the participating 
nonprofits’ ability to serve a charitable class likely to result in governmental 
savings.276  The expansion of nonprofit capabilities from SIB funding 
allows nonprofits to either provide their services to more individuals or 
better serve their existing constituency.277  This rapid growth is often not 
possible through the traditional sources of nonprofit funding, underscoring 
the necessity of SIB participation to make a greater impact.278  It is highly 
likely that SIBs would pass the qualitative prong since the economic 
realities and fundraising difficulties facing nonprofits make participation 
necessary to achieve a greater public benefit.279 
The quantitative prong dictates that an incidental private benefit must be 
“insubstantial” in comparison with the overall public benefit achieved by 
the activity.280  This requirement is difficult to interpret since the IRS has 
avoided utilizing a consistent method to analyze this prong.281  While the 
IRS has not clearly defined what level of private benefit in excess of public 
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benefit would qualify as “insubstantial,” the interest paid in SIBs could 
arguably be construed either way. 
In SIBs, it is relatively simple to measure the amount of private benefit 
that occurs.  Successful SIBs will repay investors their initial investment 
that financed the nonprofit’s social program and distribute a variable rate of 
return depending on how successful the program was at accomplishing its 
goals.282 
Valuing the public good, however, is much more challenging as it leaves 
room for interpretation.  If the IRS adopts a narrow interpretation of the 
public good—only considering the government’s cost savings from the 
SIB’s success—SIBs are more likely to fail the quantitative prong, since a 
sizable portion of the savings are passed along to pay the investors their 
investment principal and variable interest.283  Using this narrow perspective 
of the public good, it would be very difficult to categorize the private 
benefit as “insubstantial” in comparison with the public benefit.  On the 
other hand, if the IRS uses a broader approach to determine public good, 
nonprofits could make a strong claim that the resulting private benefit in 
SIBs is “insubstantial” in comparison with the public benefit.  Beyond the 
mere public benefit from governmental savings, successful SIBs will have 
delivered substantial intangible benefits to the charitable class served by the 
nonprofits.  It is difficult to value the intangible benefits on a social level 
when SIBs help individuals to avoid reincarceration and recidivism.284  
However, if the IRS uses this broader view of the resulting public benefit, it 
is very likely that SIBs would satisfy the quantitative test. 
While SIBs seemingly qualify as both qualitatively and quantitatively 
incidental, there are no guarantees the IRS will agree with this 
interpretation.  After all, the IRS has proven to inconsistently apply the 
private benefit doctrine and the incidental two-prong test from GCM 39,598 
is not binding.285 
C.  Comparison of Social Impact Bonds with Likely 
Private Benefit Transactions 
Beyond the incidental balancing test, the IRS could try to analogize SIB 
participation to other activities that have resulted in a prohibited private 
benefit.  These past examples of private benefit identified in Part I.A.3.b 
exhibit some commonalities with SIBs. 
The private profits in SIBs resemble the payments associated with both 
nonprofit debt financing and equity distributions.  While a tax-exempt 
nonprofit may borrow money from private lenders to finance their 
 
 282. See supra notes 191–96 and accompanying text. 
 283. For example, the government officials in the Rikers Island SIB have quantified the 
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private investors. See Costa & Kohli, supra note 13. 
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activities, they may not distribute profits as a return on capital to private 
individuals.286  Nonprofit debt instruments will not automatically violate 
the private benefit doctrine,287 while equity distributions will.288  Although 
called a “bond,” SIBs are more of a debt-equity hybrid that is not backed by 
hard assets or cash.289  SIBs resemble debt due to their fixed term and 
capped maximum return; however, like equity, the returns will vary 
depending on the nonprofits’ performance.290  This ambiguity underscores 
the difficulty in claiming that the private profits in SIBs are more similar to 
the permissible payouts in tax-exempt bonds or the prohibited dividends in 
an equity arrangement.  As a result, any insights from this comparison seem 
inconclusive to the overarching question whether SIBs would violate the 
private benefit doctrine. 
At first blush, the profits in SIBs appear similar to a shared revenue 
stream agreement.  Much like the prohibited shared revenue streams, certain 
SIBs allow managing nonprofits to “share” in the governmental savings 
with private investors as they both stand to receive a payout if the 
benchmarks are met.291  In GCM 39,862, the IRS struck down a shared 
revenue agreement where a nonprofit essentially outsourced some of its 
work to private individuals in return for a portion of their earnings.292  The 
shared payout possible in SIBs is far different from the arrangement at issue 
in GCM 39,862.  First, the participating nonprofits scale-up their operations 
to develop comprehensive treatment programs rather than passing off 
responsibilities to private parties.293  Second, the profits that private 
investors may achieve in SIBs occur in a one-off discrete payment from the 
government,294 not as a continuing share of revenues as was the case in 
GCM 39,862.295  Most importantly, SIBs do not directly generate revenues; 
rather, they generate governmental savings through programs designed to 
reduce recidivism or homelessness.296  Given these differences, it is very 
difficult to analogize the private benefit transaction exemplified in GCM 
39,862 to SIBs. 
SIBs also superficially resemble impermissible circular cash flow 
arrangements to an extent.  Much like Revenue Ruling 2006-27,297 the 
private investors in SIBs provide money to directly help the charitable class 
and later stand to reap the benefit from the class’s improved social 
outcomes.298  However, SIBs are not a true circular cash flow arrangement.  
 
 286. See BLAZEK, supra note 141, at 11. 
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 291. See MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 2, at 16. 
 292. See Colombo, supra note 92, at 1074. 
 293. See MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 2, at 4, 7–9. 
 294. See supra notes 196–98 and accompanying text. 
 295. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 296. See COSTA ET AL., supra note 22, at 4, 15. 
 297. See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text. 
 298. See KOHLI ET AL., supra note 10, at 4, 7–8. 
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While the private investors do front the money to the nonprofits in SIBs,299 
the nonprofits do not merely act as a conduit to transfer money to the 
charitable class.300  Instead, SIBs use the money provided by the private 
investors to implement a comprehensive program designed to achieve 
socially beneficial outcomes aimed at improving their constituents’ lives.301  
The profits occur indirectly, from eventual governmental savings,302 rather 
than directly from the nonprofit’s operations as in Revenue Ruling 2006-27.  
Unlike a circular cash flow arrangement, the charitable class in SIBs does 
not receive money from the private investors—they receive the benefits of 
the investment through improved treatment and outreach programs 
provided by the nonprofits.303  SIBs clearly do not result in a private benefit 
like the agreement in Revenue Ruling 2006-27. 
If the IRS seeks to use the broad conceptualization of private benefit 
doctrine from American Campaign Academy, SIB participation could 
endanger the tax exemption.  In American Campaign Academy, the court 
noted that a secondary benefit would be impermissible if it is “earmarked 
for a particular organization,” rather than broadly distributed among an 
industry.304  SIBs seem to run afoul of this formulation, since the private 
investors are singled out to receive a variable rate of return if the program 
successfully meets its preset performance targets.305  Before concluding that 
SIBs will always result in an impermissible private benefit, it is important 
to note that American Campaign Academy is recognized as a highly 
questionable decision that has not been relied upon in subsequent cases.306  
Also, the legal community has widely disregarded the decision as improper 
and carrying little precedential value.307  While the private benefit 
definition from American Campaign Academy seems to present a major 
issue for nonprofits participating in SIBs, the skepticism over the integrity 
of the doctrine suggests it may not be utilized again. 
None of the three examples of private benefit enumerated in Treasury 
Regulation section 1.501(c)(3)-(d)(1)(iii) would reasonably apply to SIBs.  
The first example found a private benefit when the charitable class was 
insufficiently small.308  It is highly unlikely that nonprofits participating in 
SIBs will serve an insufficiently small charitable class.  SIBs are designed 
to introduce or scale-up current charitable programs to serve a constituency 
large enough to result in meaningful government savings.309  Considering 
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the complexity and costs inherent in the SIB structure,310 it would not be 
feasible to merely benefit a small group of people as those in the first 
regulatory example.  SIBs also do not match up with the second regulatory 
example, which resulted in a clearly disproportionate commission to private 
parties without serving meaningful charitable goals.311  This does not occur 
in SIBs, which will only pay private investors a portion of governmental 
savings if the charitable class is properly served by the nonprofit.312  Lastly, 
example three, which details the retention of assets in a professional 
training agreement between a nonprofit and a for-profit entity,313 is simply 
not applicable to SIBs.  While the regulatory examples clearly describe 
three transactions that violate the private benefit doctrine, none of them are 
similar enough to the profits paid in SIBs to provide meaningful assistance 
in this analysis. 
In conclusion, the various forms of likely private benefit discussed fail to 
clearly address the SIB private benefit issue.  The superficial similarities in 
shared revenue streams and circular cash flow arrangement lack depth, the 
broad American Campaign Academy interpretation lacks support, and the 
regulatory examples altogether fail to capture the essence of the potential 
issues in the SIB’s payout structure. 
D.  Comparison of Social Impact Bonds with Joint Venture 
Private Benefit Transactions 
The separate private benefit framework utilized by the IRS when 
nonprofits enter into joint ventures with private parties may provide further 
guidance to analyze the private benefit issue in SIBs. 
Yet, before approaching the private benefit question, it is important to 
determine if SIBs are similar enough to joint ventures to warrant 
comparison.  A joint venture can be implied even when the cooperating 
parties fail to explicitly recognize their arrangement as such.314  While SIBs 
do not precisely fit the tax law definition of a joint venture,315 there are 
several resemblances between the two.  Joint ventures are enterprises 
between parties with (1) a shared interest in a common purpose, (2) a shared 
interest in the subject matter, (3) shared control over policy, and (4) shared 
profits.316 
 
 310. See COSTA ET AL., supra note 22, at 12, 16. 
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The first factor appears to be met in SIBs because the private investors 
and nonprofits share the same purpose of successfully providing charitable 
services, which will eventually lead to profits for the private investor.317  
The second factor is also plausibly satisfied in SIBs.  Although the subject 
matter in SIBs—serving a charitable class—may be of more interest to the 
nonprofits, for-profit entities have previously demonstrated an interest in 
social responsibility.318  In terms of the third factor, private investors do not 
directly share control with nonprofits in SIBs.  Investors usually will have 
little say in how the nonprofits should fulfill the SIB, although they may 
exert some control over which nonprofits are chosen to fulfill the SIB.319  
Lastly, the final factor of shared profits could be met in SIBs that extend a 
performance bonus to the managing nonprofit in addition to paying 
investors when successful.320  Much like joint ventures between private 
parties and nonprofits, participation in a SIB would allow a nonprofit to 
further its exempt purposes, diversify its sources of revenue, and obtain 
needed capital in an increasingly competitive environment.321  While the 
SIB model does not exactly mirror that of joint ventures, the appearance is 
similar enough to warrant consideration of the accompanying private 
benefit analysis. 
Following the whole-entity joint venture framework established in 
Revenue Ruling 98-15 and Redlands, the IRS uses a three-factor test to 
determine when nonprofits may preserve their exemption even when some 
private benefit occurs.322  The three factors look to whether a nonprofit can 
show that it (1) is serving a charitable purpose, (2) is able to act exclusively 
in furtherance of the purpose, and (3) retains control over management 
decisions.323  The first factor is not a problem because a nonprofit’s role in 
SIBs is to provide services to a targeted charitable class.324  The second 
factor may be an issue in SIBs, considering that the charitable purpose is 
inseparable from the investor’s underlying profit component—which 
depends upon the successful execution of the program’s charitable 
purpose.325  Lastly, the third factor of control is unlikely to be an issue in 
SIBs.  Unlike joint ventures, the nonprofits and private parties in SIBs are 
not bound to decisions from a board.326  In SIBs, the participating 
nonprofits are bound to serve a specified class, yet they are capable of 
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retaining control to formulate and implement the program to fulfill the 
SIB.327 
Altogether, the three factors seem to weigh in favor of allowing nonprofit 
SIB participants to maintain their tax-exempt status.  As noted in the 
Redlands and St. David’s decisions, the importance of retaining control is a 
key factor in determining private benefit in joint ventures.328  Since 
nonprofits in SIBs serve a charitable purpose and are capable of exercising 
control over their operations, it is unlikely that participation would result in 
an impermissible private benefit if the IRS were to analyze the issue under 
the whole-entity joint venture framework.   
If the IRS were to utilize the ancillary joint framework instead, the 
exemption would even face less scrutiny because control over operations is 
not required and the IRS takes a more deferential approach.329  
Complicating this possibility, it is somewhat more difficult to analogize 
SIBs to ancillary joint ventures. 
Ancillary joint ventures are often designed to continue or expand 
charitable services with minimal financial risk to the charitable entity.330  
The typical ancillary joint ventures have been utilized in situations where 
large nonprofit institutions, such as schools and hospitals, partner with a 
private entity to operate small side projects together.331  SIBs may require 
the participating nonprofits to direct most or all of their assets to pursue 
their targeted goals, given the advantages of selecting proven nonprofits 
capable of scaling-up successful operations to a larger charitable class.332  
Yet, a SIB could be structured more like an ancillary joint venture by 
dividing up the program between multiple nonprofits, where each nonprofit 
provides a portion of the services required in a comprehensive outreach 
program.333  If this were the case and the IRS were to use the Revenue 
Ruling 2004-51 analysis, nonprofits in SIBs could avoid the private benefit 
problem if participation would only account for an insubstantial portion of 
the organization’s overall activities.334  Regardless, the precedential value 
of Revenue Ruling 2004-51 is tenuous considering private benefit is never 
explicitly mentioned in the text and academics continue to debate its proper 
interpretation.335 
Since SIBs are not quite the same as joint ventures, there is no guarantee 
the IRS will employ either joint venture private benefit framework to 
determine the issue.  Despite this, if the IRS chooses to scrutinize the 
private benefit occurring in SIBs similar to either the whole-entity or 
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ancillary joint ventures, participating nonprofits stand a good chance of 
retaining the tax exemption. 
E.  Conclusions 
Having examined the SIB’s private benefit issue in comparison with 
incidental private benefit transactions, likely private benefit transactions, 
and joint venture private benefit transactions, this part has illustrated how 
the IRS may view the issue.  It is important to remember that the majority 
of the preceding analysis assumes that the IRS would seek to use a more 
aggressive ex post approach to scrutinize the profit payout to private 
investors.336  If the IRS takes the broader ex ante view of SIBs, the threat of 
a private benefit issue is very attenuated.337  Even under the ex post 
approach, there is a strong argument that the private benefit possible in 
SIBs should be deemed incidental and not similar enough to any of the 
likely private benefit transactions.338 
Despite these indications to the contrary, private benefit could persist as 
an issue since the doctrine remains an ad hoc tool, which the IRS has used 
“even when charitable purposes might globally outweigh a private benefit 
transaction.”339  Some valuable charitable goals can only be achieved by 
conferring third-party profits, however this fact does not excuse application 
of the private benefit doctrine.340  While it would be difficult to find a 
prohibited private benefit in a conventional SIB arrangement, the lingering 
private benefit specter may deter certain nonprofits from engaging in a SIB 
if it could jeopardize their tax exemption.  If SIBs become implemented on 
a widespread basis, it could result in a push to modify the current private 
benefit framework in force. 
The impact of SIBs is just beginning to be felt as more programs are 
being finalized and more investors become comfortable with the model.341  
In the wake of further expansion, the nonprofit industry and regulators 
could be forced to face the lurking private benefit issue identified and 
analyzed in this Note.  While the IRS may not have a problem with SIBs in 
their current promising infancy, perhaps its stance will change when 
Goldman or other institutional investors begin to realize the profits from the 
successful work of nonprofits participating in SIBs. 
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III.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NONPROFITS PARTICIPATING IN SOCIAL 
IMPACT BONDS TO AVOID THE PRIVATE BENEFIT ISSUE 
AND RETAIN THEIR EXEMPTION 
This part seeks to offer solutions to the private benefit issue in SIBs and 
ensure that nonprofit participants will not jeopardize their tax-exempt 
status.  Part III.A suggests how nonprofits could seek a legislative or 
regulatory exemption to the private benefit doctrine.  Part III.B offers 
recommendations on how SIBs can be structured in a specific manner to 
mitigate the potential private benefit issue. 
A.  Seek Legislative or Regulatory Changes to the Private Benefit Doctrine 
First, this section examines the debate over whether protecting nonprofit 
participants in SIBs from private benefit concerns would be a sound policy 
choice.  Then, it closes by discussing how a governmental change to the 
private benefit doctrine could be accomplished. 
1.  Whether the Government Should Protect Social Impact Bonds from the 
Private Benefit Doctrine:  The Social Impact Bond Policy Debate 
While none of the implemented SIBs have matured at this point, there 
has already been much commentary supporting or criticizing the concept.342  
To better understand the magnitude of the private benefit issue, it is 
important to consider the positive and negative policy implications of SIBs. 
If SIB advocates decide to seek governmental support against private 
benefit, there are several arguments why SIBs deserve protection.  As 
previously discussed in Part I.A.2, one of the main policy rationales for the 
existence of the private benefit doctrine is to ensure that the charitable 
purpose is preserved.343  Since SIBs are designed to clearly serve a 
charitable purpose,344 despite the accompanying potential for private 
profits, using the private benefit doctrine to revoke the tax exemption for 
participating nonprofits would be counterproductive.  In addition, if a 
nonprofit loses the exemption, it will normally reduce or eliminate the 
amount of charitable goods and services provided.345  While SIBs may 
confer profits on private investors, the concurrent public good is likely to be 
far greater—a justification that should spare nonprofits from vulnerability 
to the private benefit doctrine.  Unless the government can offer some 
protection for nonprofits contemplating SIBs, fears over losing the federal 
tax exemption could prevent further participation and limit the execution of 
major social programs for the poor.  Without the risk of revocation, SIBs 
could lead to increased capital contributions to nonprofits and more 
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effective charity work.346  Lastly, it is important to solve this issue because 
if it remains unanswered, potential interference from the amorphous private 
benefit doctrine could “discourage efficiency and ultimately harm charitable 
beneficiaries.”347 
Several commentators have taken a skeptical approach to SIBs, 
concerned that participation could lead to nonprofit “mission drift.”348  One 
writer has noted that mingling nonprofit goals with for-profit ones could 
end up corrupting the underlying good being accomplished.349  Professor 
Mark Rosenman echoed these views when asked about the potential effects 
of SIBs, stating, “When we seek to introduce the profit motive, we begin to 
abandon who we are as a people and abandon our responsibility for the 
common good in pursuit of private profit.”350  Raising a separate issue, 
some nonprofit leaders worry that nonprofit giving would shift toward 
profit-driven SIBs and away from outright donations.351 
Despite these potential negatives, SIBs provide an innovative method to 
expand funding to nonprofits that benefits a large charitable class without 
requiring immediate governmental financial commitments or close 
oversight.352  Each SIB participant’s interests are aligned to ensure that the 
charitable purpose is properly served throughout the term of the SIB, 
leaving the profit motive in the background.353  SIBs are not intended to be 
a complete replacement for governmental grants or donations,354 limiting 
concerns that SIBs could divert money away from conventional funding 
methods.  Further, SIBs will always be more expensive for the government 
than conventional nonprofit funding methods because of the potential 
interest payment to investors and the associated costs in developing and 
tracking the performance metrics.355  Ultimately, SIBs attempt to bring 
together successful nonprofits, socially conscious investors, and 
governmental agencies to remedy serious social issues and reduce 
government obligations.356  If this proposition is accepted, it is clear that 
nonprofits participating in SIBs should have their tax-exempt status 
protected from the private benefit doctrine. 
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2.  How the Government Could Limit the Private Benefit Issue 
While the IRS seemingly would have a hard time finding a valid private 
benefit in SIBs,357 the issue could linger and raise doubt unless there is a 
clear indication to the contrary from the government.  Even following the 
September 11th attacks, a governmental response was required to allay 
private benefit concerns relating to relief payments for victims and their 
families.358  Since cash grants to disaster victims not classified as “poor” 
could result in a prohibited private benefit, the IRS responded with Notice 
2001-78 to quell any possible issues.359  In the notice, the IRS claimed that 
such grants would be considered for an exempt purpose if made “in good 
faith using objective standards.”360  Even this assurance from the IRS was 
not enough to dispel private benefit concerns and Congress enacted 
legislation that effectively removed the private benefit analysis from 
September 11th disaster relief payments.361  Lacking even the assurances of 
an IRS statement akin to Notice 2001-78, nonprofits that participate in SIBs 
will remain vulnerable to the private benefit doctrine. 
Given the lessons from the September 11th donations, supporters of SIBs 
could lobby the government to waive the private benefit issue for 
participating nonprofits.  While it may be difficult to mobilize legislation to 
support SIBs as they remain in their infancy, a supportive statement or 
regulation from the IRS could be sought instead.  In fact, Congress 
delegated authority to the IRS to determine when third-party profit taking is 
consistent with the federal tax exemption.362  The IRS could be pressured to 
use this authority to waive private benefit analysis for nonprofits that 
participate in SIBs.  Even a nonbinding pronouncement similar to Notice 
2001-78 that the IRS will not pursue private benefit challenges against 
nonprofits in SIBs would be beneficial. 
Going a step further, the private benefit issue in SIBs could present a 
good opportunity for the IRS to overhaul the private benefit doctrine.  
Professor Jones has suggested that the private benefit doctrine should be 
simplified to a deferential business judgment rule analysis when a nonprofit 
organization confers profits to third parties indispensable to the charitable 
goal.363  This approach argues that the IRS “should not substitute its 
judgment for that of nonprofit managers regarding the degree to which 
accomplishing the charitable goal is worth explicit third-party profit-
taking.”364  Utilizing this framework in the SIB context, participating 
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nonprofits would likely receive the deferential business judgment rule 
because the successful fulfillment of charitable goals is indispensable to 
achieving private profits.365  Given the purported merits of SIBs,366 the 
benefits of adopting Professor Jones’s approach could provide a much-
needed limit on the boundless private benefit doctrine. 
Although Congress has acknowledged that nonprofit legislation is 
outdated and in need of reappraisal,367 there have been no clear indications 
they will take action to change this anytime soon.  Perhaps the emergence 
of SIBs will provide an extra impetus for changes to the private benefit 
doctrine as both the government and nonprofits would stand to achieve 
significant benefits if SIBs are supported.368 
B.  Structure the Social Impact Bond To Mitigate Private Benefit 
To avoid the costs, difficulty, and slow pace of lobbying for doctrinal 
changes, an easier solution would be to simply structure SIBs in the manner 
least likely to run afoul of the private benefit doctrine.  The remainder of 
this part provides a few suggestions on how to accomplish this. 
First, the government originating a SIB should attempt to set the 
expected payout to private investors at zero or less.  The government is 
likely to have control over this because they typically are the party 
responsible for initiating a SIB once it has identified a specific public 
outreach goal that will result in cost savings.369  Since private investors 
stand to lose 100 percent of their investment if there is no supportive 
guarantee370 and the benchmarks are not met,371 SIBs can carry a negative 
expected payout, despite the potential interest to be paid.  Setting an 
expected payout at zero or less would consequently limit the kinds of 
investors likely to be interested in SIBs to those who prioritize philanthropy 
over financial profits.372  This solution may prove particularly effective if 
the IRS uses an ex ante approach373 to frame the private benefit issue.  
Assuming this were to be the case, the expected negative value to investors 
as a whole suggests that the private benefit would almost certainly be 
deemed incidental and the tax exemption would be undisturbed. 
Second, SIBs should be designed to ensure that no money passes through 
the nonprofits, other than that necessary to implement the program or scale-
up operations.  If a tax-exempt nonprofit directly participates in the 
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exchange of funds with the government and investors as in a “self-
implemented” SIB,374 private benefit is more likely to be an issue.  It would 
be preferable to keep this money-transferring role separate from the 
nonprofits that provide the services to the charitable class in the SIB.  This 
can be accomplished by utilizing an independent intermediary organization 
to disburse funds to the nonprofits and transfer money from the government 
to the private investors375—further isolating the tax-exempt nonprofits from 
the for-profit components of the SIB.  While the inclusion of a separate 
intermediary organization would not entirely eliminate a participating 
nonprofit’s connection to private profits, it would diminish the already 
tenuous argument for finding a private benefit in SIBs. 
Lastly, the participating nonprofits should be given control over how they 
will interact with the charitable class and implement the SIB program.  
Given the lessons from Redlands and St. David’s, control in whole-entity 
joint ventures has become a crucial component to determine private 
benefit.376  To account for this, a government agency could implement a 
SIB by specifying the desired outcome and timeframe but leave the details 
on how to accomplish this to the participating nonprofits.377  If nonprofits 
in SIBs retain control over their day-to-day operations, it is less likely the 
private investors’ tangential profit motive will interfere with their charitable 
goals.  Since the private benefit doctrine seeks to ensure that the charitable 
purpose is not overly disturbed by third-party profit-taking,378 allowing 
participating nonprofits to retain control could be an important step to avoid 
revocation of the tax exemption. 
While each of these structural suggestions could prove beneficial to 
nonprofits attempting to avoid the private benefit issue, they also create 
friction with other SIB participants.  Lowering expected payouts will turn 
away certain investors,379 using a separate intermediary organization will 
increase costs to the government,380 and ceding too much control to 
nonprofits will increase the risk that the SIB may fail to accomplish the 
desired social outcomes.381  As a result, nonprofits should expect to face 
some difficulty when bargaining for these or other structural solutions that 
could mitigate private benefit concerns. 
 
 374. For a clear graphical representation of how the participants interact in a “self-
implemented” SIB, see COSTA ET AL., supra note 22, at 10. 
 375. See id. at 13. 
 376. See supra notes 172–75 and accompanying text. 
 377. See COSTA ET AL., supra note 22, at 3–4 (suggesting that the government should not 
mandate how nonprofits should accomplish the desired outcomes). 
 378. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 379. See supra note 372 and accompanying text. 
 380. See MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 2, at 40–41, 48 (noting that intermediaries will 
likely require management fees). 
 381. See COSTA ET AL., supra note 22, at 16. 
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CONCLUSION 
SIBs present an important new method to implement major social 
programs and scale-up successful nonprofits by changing the conventional 
social service funding paradigm—shifting the financial risk of failed 
programs from the government to private investors.  Private benefit remains 
a threat to nonprofits participating in SIBs mainly due to muddled 
interpretations that have allowed the doctrine to apply to a wide variety of 
transactions where a private party profits in connection with nonprofit 
activities. 
While it is possible to compare SIBs with past forms of private benefit, 
the SIB structure defies convention and cannot be simply analogized.  
Overall, the risk of violating the private benefit doctrine is low in SIBs 
considering there are strong indications that the IRS would consider any 
private profits incidental to the overreaching charitable purpose; however, 
this is no guarantee.  Ideally, the government should take action to dispel 
the specter of private benefit embedded in SIBs to encourage further 
nonprofit SIB participation, which is capable of expanding services to the 
poor and needy.  Until this is accomplished, nonprofits should take the risk 
that SIB participation will not violate the private benefit doctrine and seek 
to mitigate this possibility by bargaining for certain structural protections. 
